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I. INTRODUCTION
XAPaTn HAPPENS WHEN a flight attendant becomes preg-
V nant? Sue, a female flight attendant working for a major
airline explains, "She can keep working, she just gets transferred
to light duty, like the other disabled workers."' When asked
whether it is fair that an airline requires its female flight attend-
ants to go on mandatory unpaid maternity leave at the twenty-
seventh week of pregnancy, Claire, a physician's assistant, re-
sponds, "That's only safe. You wouldn't want a pregnant woman
going into preterm labor and delivering a baby on a plane,
would you?"2
Pregnant women and the airline industry have endured a
long and contentious history. As early as the 1930s, women were
employed as stewardesses and were subject to harsh restrictions,
including automatic termination upon becoming pregnant and
ineligibility for the job if one had a child. With the passage of
Title VII and later the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, women ex-
perienced much greater employment opportunities, such as be-
ing allowed to work longer into their pregnancies and being
legally allowed to pursue both a career and a family.4 Yet today
the airline industry remains in a unique position regarding its
pregnant flight attendants and is one of the only industries
where the courts allow an employer to enforce mandatory ma-
ternity leave at a certain point during pregnancy, regardless of
individual capacity to work.5 Although women are typically ex-
cluded from their employment for only a few months, this situa-
tion occurs consistently and presents a complex social problem
juxtaposing gender discrimination, disability rights, and public
safety. It is particularly troubling when considering the goals of
Title VII, the economic necessity of earning a paycheck, and the
harsh realities these women experience if they must abruptly
stop working for several months while preparing for a child.
I Characters and their responses are loosely based on real conversations. The
women's names have been changed.
2 "Preterm labor . . . is labor that begins before thirty-seven weeks of preg-
nancy" and "occur[s] in about [twelve] percent of all pregnancies in the U.S." It
is one of the leading causes of infant mortality. Preterm Labor and Birth, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/
pretermjlabor andbirth.cfm.
3 TammyJulian, Comment, How Title VII Has Affected the Airline Industry, 11 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 281, 282 (1992).
4 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
5 See Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam).
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This article will explore the current state of the law and air-
line policies regarding pregnant workers, focusing on flight at-
tendants, and will make suggestions for how to better balance
the competing interests of disabled workers, public safety, and
pregnant women's rights to be free from discrimination and to
pursue equal employment opportunities. Part II will delineate
the history of treatment of pregnant flight attendants in the air-
line industry. As the conversations with Sue and Claire illus-
trate, misconceptions concerning employer policies and
arguments focusing on safety concerns are common. Part III
will analyze pregnancy policies and requirements common
among airline employers under Title VII and the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, particularly regarding flight attendants. This
section will focus on the problems with the current state of the
law and policies, particularly how they enable discrimination
and make it difficult to advocate for change by pitting public
safety and disability rights against women's equal employment
rights. Part IV will present possible solutions for a better bal-
ance of the competing interests at stake.
II. HISTORY OF PREGNANT FLIGHT ATTENDANTS
Women were first recruited by the airline industry as flight
attendants in the 1930s.6 These first female flight attendants
were required to be trained nurses, nursing being one of the few
professions open to women at the time.7 Because of their skills
as nurses, women were thought to be able to nurture and take
care of the airlines' mostly male clients.' In fact, later on, in
response to calls for male flight attendants, the airlines would
argue that women were in a unique position to care for the psy-
chological needs of the male passengers, needs that were associ-
ated with the stress and anxiety of flying.9 Thus, in a way the
airlines glorified women, although only for one of their tradi-
tional gender roles, that of nurturer or caregiver. Interestingly,
while the airlines argued that women were valuable as natural
nurturers, they continued to deny employment to women who
6 Julian, supra note 3, at 282; Toni Scott Reed, Comment, Flight Attendant Fu-
ries: Is Title VI Really the Solution to Hiring Policy Problems? 58J. AIR L. & COM. 267,
269 (1992).
7 Julian, supra note 3, at 282.
8 Id.
9 See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971).
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were pregnant, had children, or were married." They thus ex-
ploited this gender stereotype, but denied it at the same time.
By the 1960s, the role of the female flight attendant morphed
into a sex symbol. 1 Women were employed because of their sex
appeal and ability to sell the airline's brand. 12 This commodifi-
cation of women brought with it many restrictions, as women
were crammed into the confining picture of a petite, sexually
available woman wearing hot pants in a magazine advertise-
ment. 13 These restrictions included immediate termination
based on weight, height, marriage, and age requirements. 4
Thus, prior to the passage of Title VII in 1964, the job of flight
attendant was limited only to single women without children
under the age of thirty-five. 15
Because the airlines employed an entirely female flight at-
tendant workforce during this time, they were forced to con-
front pregnancy issues early on. Many airlines required
pregnant flight attendants to alert their employers as soon as
they discovered their pregnancies, at which point the flight at-
tendants were automatically discharged.' 6 Not only were flight
attendants not allowed to work during pregnancy, but they were
not allowed to return to work after giving birth.'7 Pregnancy
and motherhood were thus incompatible with employment as a
flight attendant. The reasons airlines gave for these policies
were not necessarily informed by science. According to the air-
lines, pregnant flight attendants were bad for business: "custom-
ers preferred seeing young, attractive, single women."'"
However, in Southwest Airlines' own study, it found that attrac-
tive flight attendants were ranked fifth in a customer preference
survey, "behind on-time departures, frequent flights, helpful res-
ervations and grounds personnel, and convenient departure
times."1 9 In addition, airlines cited safety concerns related to
flying and pregnancy. It was in the mother's and fetus's best
interests to keep them on the ground.20 Yet this idea would also






16 See, e.g., In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249, 254 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
17 See In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1978).
18 Reed, supra note 6, at 271.
19 Id. at 272.
20 See In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 259.
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be found to lack a scientific basis, as courts found no evidence
that flying endangered the health of the mother or the fetus.2
Furthermore, in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., the Supreme Court firmly rejected fetal protection claims
by an employer, stating that "[d]ecisions about the welfare of
future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear,
support, and raise them rather than to the employers who hire
those parents. '22 Despite gaps in scientific evidence and reason-
ing, airlines continued to impose restrictions on their female
flight attendants.
A. TITLE VII
Yet in 1964, the airline industry saw the beginnings of a mo-
mentous change. While most scholars agree that the inclusion
of Title VII in the 1964 Civil Rights Act was a "historical acci-
dent," designed primarily to prevent the bill's passage, Title VII
was nevertheless passed by Congress and stated that employers
could not discriminate against women because of their sex.23
However, it was unclear whether the term "sex" included preg-
nancy and thus whether Title VII protected women from dis-
crimination based on pregnancy as well as gender.24
Furthermore, perhaps because of the last-minute inclusion of
the sex discrimination provision, women's activists found them-
selves divided over the meaning of Title VII.2 5 While some wo-
men's activists favored the equal treatment language of Title
VII, others were wary of potentially harmful ramifications for
women and supported many of the protectionist laws in place at
the time, such as "maximum hours" or "weightlifting limits,"
that shielded women from unaccommodating workplaces and
guarded their role as mothers.26 Others supported the general
idea of protectionist laws, but wanted them updated to better
reflect women's actual abilities and status in the workplace.27
For example, Mary Keyserling, head of the Department of La-
bor's Women's Bureau, stated that "these laws were put on the
21 See, e.g., id.
22 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991).
23 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006);
Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 3 (2009).
24 Pedriana, supra note 23, at 8.
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books by women's organizations in the interest of women . . .
[and] sought to eliminate the real abuses which prevailed widely
in industry ... the freeing of women from employment discrimi-
nation does not demand that they all have identical treat-
ment."28 Eventually-and due in large part to pressure from the
National Organization for Women (NOW) to eradicate "all sex-
specific employment practices"-the protectionist laws were dis-
banded.29 Groups that had pushed for the recognition of inher-
ent differences, biologically and socially, between men and
women thus lost the public debate to groups that framed discus-
sions in terms of equality for both genders and minimized dif-
ferences between the sexes.3 0
Despite the passage of Title VII, the first suits challenging
pregnancy discrimination were brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment." For example, although Title VII was passed in
1964, attorneys in 1974 brought a pregnancy discrimination suit
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur under the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 2 In LaFleur, public school teachers challenged
two school boards' mandatory maternity leave policies under
the Equal Protection Clause, one requiring maternity leave at
the fourth month of pregnancy and the other at the fifth
month. The Sixth Circuit had held that the five-month policy
discriminated against pregnant women without justification, but
the Fourth Circuit had upheld the four-month policy's constitu-
tionality. 4 In spite of these conflicting decisions, neither policy
seemed supported by "growing evidence and medical consensus
that many women were capable of working . . . [during] their
pregnancies. 35
The Supreme Court sided with the Sixth Circuit, but did so
on due process grounds. 6 Mandatory leave regulations could
not be justified by the need for continuity in education, adminis-
trative convenience, or "the state interest in keeping physically
28 Id. at 3-4 (quoting EEOC, WHrrE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON EQUAL EMP'T OP-
PORTUNITY, DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX 22 (1965) (panel transcript available
in the EEOC Library, Washington, D.C.)).
29 Id. at 5-6.
30 Id. at 4.
31 Id. at 6-7.
32 414 U.S. 632, 632 (1974).
33 Id.
'4 Id. at 636-38.
35 Pedriana, supra note 23, at 7.
36 LaFeur, 414 U.S. at 648.
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unfit teachers out of the classroom" to ensure student safety.3 7
Because the policies conclusively presumed that women could
not work past a fixed point in time, when ultimately the ability
to work during pregnancy is an individual matter, they violated
the plaintiffs' due process rights to bear children without gov-
ernment interference and unduly penalized women for the deci-
sion to have a child .3  Because the Court based its holding on
constitutional rights, it did not address whether Title VII in-
cludes discrimination based on pregnancy.3 9 However, lower
trial and appellate courts consistently decided that it did.4 °
B. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
Particularly unsettling in the line of early pregnancy discrimi-
nation cases was the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert that pregnancy discrimination was not
barred by Title VII.4' In Gilbert, the Court found that an em-
ployer's disability benefits plan did not violate Title VII when it
failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities.42 In response,
Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in
1978 to make clear that discrimination in employment based on
pregnancy or a pregnancy-related condition is illegal.4 3 Specifi-
cally, Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer...
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.4"
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act added to the definition of
"sex:"
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy ... or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy
. . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related pur-
37 Id. at 647-48.
38 Id. at 645-46, 648.
39 Pedriana, supra note 23, at 7-8.
40 Id. at 6.
41 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976); Pedriana, supra note 23, at 1.
42 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
43 Pedriana, supra note 23, at 1.
44 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (em-
phasis added).
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poses, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work.4 5
This piece of legislation thus overturned the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilbert and resolved the question that the Court had
previously avoided by encompassing pregnancy within the
meaning of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.4 6 It also
demonstrated that the debate about women's treatment in the
workplace was now unambiguously focused on equal treatment.
For example, as one witness testified in the congressional hear-
ings regarding the PDA,
Employers routinely fire pregnant workers, refuse to hire them,
strip them of seniority rights, and deny them sick leave and medi-
cal benefits given other workers. Such policies have a lifetime
impact on women's careers. Together, they add up to one basic
fact: employers use women's role of childbearer as the central
justification of and support for discrimination against women
workers. Thus, discrimination against women workers cannot be
eradicated unless the root discrimination, based on pregnancy
and childbirth, is also eliminated.47
As the Supreme Court stated, "[W] omen as capable of doing
their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to
choose between having a child and having a job."'48
C. TITLE VII, THE PDA, AND THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The late 1970s and the 1980s saw a flurry of litigation in the
airline industry concerning pregnancy. However, these cases
came to different conclusions than similar cases in other indus-
tries.4 9 For example, while LaFleur seemed to suggest that an
45 Id. § 2000e(k).
46 Pedriana, supra note 23, at 1.
47 Id. at 12 (quoting Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Preg-
nancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055 and H.R 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Emp't Opportuni-
ties of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong. 31-32 (1977) (statement of
Susan Deller Ross, Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers)).
48 Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
49 See Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1984) (airline
policy requiring flight attendants to resign or transfer to ground positions upon
becoming pregnant is justified as business necessity); In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434
F. Supp. 249, 263 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (airline could not require mandatory maternity
leave before thirteen weeks, but could allow individual evaluation between thir-
teen and twenty weeks); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413,
422, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (airline could require mandatory maternity leave upon
knowledge of pregnancy because nausea, vomiting, and other pregnancy-related
symptoms may interfere with a flight attendant's ability to do her job safely);
410
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employer would have difficulty justifying a "sweeping"
mandatory maternity leave requirement, courts were much
more lenient with the airline industry. In In re National Airlines,
Inc., the court struck down an employment policy requiring a
flight attendant's removal from her position immediately upon
discovery of her pregnancy.50 The court held that employment
and the decisibn to have children are protected interests. 5' The
airline's no-motherhood policy impinged on the choice to work
and have children because "many flight attendants are capable
of working during pregnancy and some need the income.
51
Thus, flight attendants "may delay their attempt to become
pregnant because they cannot afford to go without" income for
several months." Furthermore, there is no other condition that
has similar effects, and because pregnancy is a uniquely female
condition and is "inevitably sex-linked," this policy had a dispro-
portionate impact on women. The airline asserted a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, stating that it is
dangerous to passengers, the mother, and the fetus for a preg-
nant flight attendant to continue working.55 The court rejected
the latter two claims, stating that there was no medical evidence
presented showing that flying is dangerous to the health of the
mother and that it is the mother's decision and not the court's
to decide what is in the best interest of the fetus. 56 The court
found it particularly persuasive that a competitor, Northwest Air-
lines, had a policy allowing pregnant stewardesses to fly until
their twenty-eighth week if cleared by a doctor, and that, of
2,500 pregnant stewardesses, none reported fetal abnormali-
ties. 57 Also interesting was that by counting back from the date
of birth, National's own data showed that most women waited
until the third month of pregnancy before grounding them-
selves, and some waited even until the fifth month. 58 The court
EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 626, 627-28 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (airline
could require mandatory maternity leave upon knowledge of pregnancy); Ma-
cLennan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 472 (E.D. Va. 1977) (airline
could not require mandatory maternity leave before twenty-sixth week).
50 434 F. Supp. at 258. See also In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d
,1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1978).
51 In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 257.
52 Id. at 259.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 258-59.
55 Id. at 259.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 262.
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also rejected National's claim that flying while pregnant in-
creases the occurrence of birth defects and spontaneous abor-
tions for lack of any evidence.59
However, the court was receptive to National's argument that
pregnant flight attendants pose a threat to passenger safety.60
Although the court rejected the claim that a flight attendant
should be grounded before the thirteenth week of pregnancy
(consensus among medical experts showed that a pregnant
flight attendant at this stage can perform the same duties as a
non-pregnant flight attendant), it found that between the thir-
teenth and twentieth weeks, National could implement a policy
requiring that individual pregnant flight attendants be cleared
by a doctor of National's choice before flying, and further, that
a flight attendant should be automatically barred from flying af-
ter the twentieth week of pregnancy due to concerns about her
adequate performance of required safety duties in an emer-
gency.6" Specifically, the court was concerned about a flight at-
tendant in the third trimester of her pregnancy being able to
evacuate a plane in ninety seconds, lift a 130-pound life raft, fit
through a narrow hatch, and open a door requiring 100 pounds
of force. 2
In a similar case, the court in Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
again disallowed mandatory maternity leave for flight attendants
before thirteen weeks of pregnancy, but reversed the lower
court's finding that Eastern must evaluate flight attendants indi-
vidually between the thirteenth and twenty-eighth week of preg-
nancy.13 Eastern asserted the BFOQ defense, stating that its
policy of mandatory maternity leave immediately upon knowl-
edge of pregnancy was justified because pregnant flight attend-
ants could hinder the safe evacuation of passengers in the event
of an emergency.64 The court found that a mandatory leave pol-
icy was necessary to the safe and efficient operation of Eastern's
business and that determining maternity leave on an individual
basis would not accomplish this purpose.65 Instead, Eastern
could require mandatory leave after thirteen weeks of preg-
59 Id. at 259.
60 Id. at 263.
61 Id. at 262-63.
62 Id. at 260.
63 633 F.2d 361, 366-67 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
64 Id. at 365.
65 Id. at 373.
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nancy.66 As the court reasoned, "We do not minimize the im-
portance of that working time to individual women who may
desire and need the income which they would earn. In choos-
ing between two critical values, however, passenger safety is suffi-
ciently compelling to override this impact. "67 With this
statement, the court effectively pitted women's rights against
passenger safety and found that passenger safety outweighs a wo-
man's claim to be free from gender discrimination.
However, this holding appears suspect, as the dissent (written
by Judge Butzner and joined by three others) pointed out.68 In-
terestingly, knowledge of pregnancy was Eastern's only health-
related involuntary leave requirement; all other health problems
were evaluated based on the individual's ability to perform flight
duties, including both diabetes and epilepsy, which medical ex-
perts testified are more disabling than pregnancy.6 " Further-
more, as the dissent also noted, while the case was on appeal,
Eastern actually changed its policy, allowing pregnant flight at-
tendants to work as long as their doctors or Eastern's medical
department certified their capability."y Thus, this policy change
suggested that an individual evaluation regarding capability dur-
ing pregnancy is a workable option.7'
Acting in concert with Title VII on airline workplace policies
was the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). Following the
passage of the PDA in 1978, employers were forced to treat a
pregnant employee who experienced a temporary disability due
to her pregnancy the same as other temporarily disabled em-
ployees.72 While this seems straightforward, feminists and wo-
men's rights activists were divided over what it meant in
practice.73 Did "the PDA prohibit[] employers from treating
pregnant workers more favorably than other temporarily dis-
abled employees[?] '74 The debate was similar to the one that
had erupted around Title VII, with women arguing on both
sides. Some women's rights activists argued for "equal treat-
66 Id.
67 Id. at 372.
6 See id. at 373 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 365, 376.
70 Id. at 376.
71 Id. at 377.
72 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
73 Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcom-
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ment," meaning that pregnant employees should receive "ex-
actly the same rights as other temporarily disabled" employees. 75
Others thought that courts should embrace an "accommodation
approach, which would permit employers to treat pregnant wo-
men better than other temporarily disabled workers as necessi-
tated by the physical effects of pregnancy."7 The Supreme
Court ultimately ruled in California Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation v. Guerra that "Congress intended the PDA to be 'a floor
beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not
a ceiling above which they may not rise.' ,,77 Thus, employers
can award their pregnant employees benefits and protections
that they do not offer to other temporarily disabled workers.7 8
The Court came to this conclusion after considering the
extensive legislative history discussing the adverse impact of dis-
crimination against pregnant workers. 79 While the Court ac-
knowledged that the legislative history says the PDA does not
require employers to treat their pregnant workers better than
their other employees, neither does the PDA prohibit employers
from doing so. 80 Thus, while the debate between equal treat-
ment and special regulation regarding Title VII ended squarely
on the side of equal treatment, the debate between equal treat-
ment and special treatment surrounding the PDA ended in
favor of special treatment, or at least allowing the possibility of
special treatment for pregnant women.
Although it involved a ticketing sales agent and not a flight
attendant, Urbano v. Continental Airlines highlights the effects of
the PDA and a common problem among airlines regarding
pregnant flight attendants who are temporarily disabled prior to
their mandatory maternity leave date."' In Urbano, a female tick-
eting sales agent became pregnant and suffered lower-back
pain.8 2 Her job duties required that she lift passengers' often-
heavy baggage. 3 Her physician ordered her to refrain from lift-
ing more than twenty pounds during her pregnancy, "so [she]
requested to work in a Service Center Agent position, which
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.; Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 279 (1987).
78 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 25.
79 Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285.
80 Id. at 285-87.
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[did] not require lifting heavy loads. '8 4 However, Continental's
light duty policy only applied to employees injured on the job.
Thus, the court held that because Ms. Urbano's condition
(pregnancy) was not caused by an on-the-job injury, she could
be denied a transfer to temporary light duty work since this
work was not available to other employees injured off the job.8
The airline provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employment action, and a finding for the plaintiff would
have had the effect of granting special treatment for pregnant
employees, which the PDA does not require."
Urbano thus shows the tension between the PDA's prohibition
on discrimination against pregnant women and the needs of
other temporarily disabled workers. However, as the Court
noted in Guerra, the purpose of the PDA "is to guarantee women
the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce,
without denying them the fundamental right to full participa-
tion in family life." 8 As Justice Stevens said in his concurrence,
the PDA should be interpreted within the context of Title VII.s9
There is a distinction between discrimination against members
of a specific class and discrimination in favor of members of that
class, and the PDA does not require absolute neutrality.90 While
the court's language in Urbano focused on the rights of pregnant
workers in comparison to other disabled workers, perhaps it
should have focused primarily on pregnancy limiting women's
equal employment opportunities.
D. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAvE ACT
The final chapter in the line of anti-sex discrimination legisla-
tion involves the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (FMLA), fifteen years after the PDA."' This statute applies
only to employers with fifty or more employees and to employ-
ees who have worked for their employer for at least twelve
months.92 It provides both eligible men and women up to
84 Jennifer Yue, Note, The Flood of Pregnancy Discrimination Cases: Balancing the
Interests of Pregnant Women and Their Employers, 96 KY. L.J. 487, 493 (2007-2008).
85 Ubano, 138 F.3d at 205.
86 Id. at 206.
87 Yue, supra note 84, at 494.
88 Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987).
89 Id. at 293-94 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 294.
9 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 25.
92 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612-2654 (2006)).
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twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year to care for a newborn,
adopted child, seriously ill family member, or one's own serious
health condition." What it means for pregnant women is that
an eligible pregnant worker may take up to twelve weeks of un-
paid maternity leave during her pregnancy or after she gives
birth. 4 An employer must continue to offer the employee
health benefits during this time.95 Although the employee may
not be paid for this time off, she will be guaranteed her position
or, if it is no longer available, one equal in pay, benefits, and
responsibility when she returns.96 The FMILA thus provides sev-
eral substantive, guaranteed protections to pregnant workers as
opposed to the general promise of freedom from discrimination
of Title VII and the PDA.97
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW, EMPLOYER
POLICIES, AND WHY THEY ARE PROBLEMATIC
While the passage of Title VII, the PDA, and the FMLA ap-
peared to chip away at discriminatory practices against pregnant
flight attendants in the airline industry, current airline policies
regarding mandatory maternity leave look fairly similar to those
of the late 1970s and the 1980s. In fact, it is as if this field, once
a hotspot for action and change, is stagnant. 8 Why is it that
airlines are able to maintain their mandatory maternity leave
policies when other industries have been forced to abandon
them?
A. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
If Title VII and the PDA cracked the dam holding up the air-
line industry's mandatory maternity leave policies, the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense provided the glue to
stop the floodgates. Title VII provides for the BFOQ defense,
encompassed in Section 703(e):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, . . . it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for any employer
to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of his religion,
sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
93 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 25.
94 See id.
95 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614(c)(1).
96 Id. § 2614(a) (1).
97 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 29.
98 See Reed, supra note 6, at 281-82.
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reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.99
Congress thus provided a statutory defense to a Title VII claim
where an employer can establish that discrimination based on
sex is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
business." 100
The BFOQ defense provides employers a way to get around
Title VII's ban on gender discrimination by allowing employers
to argue that their discriminatory behavior is necessary for their
business. 10 1 However, the BFOQ defense has been interpreted
extremely narrowly.10 2 In fact, one of the only other industries
besides the airline industry where employers can assert safety-
related BFOQ defenses in response to a claim of gender discrim-
ination is the prison system."' The Supreme Court has upheld
sexually discriminatory hiring practices of prison guards because
of the necessity of security, the violence of male prisoners, and
the risk to this security that female guards pose in prisons be-
cause of their "womanhood" and likelihood to incite violence
and aggression in this environment.0 4 Courts have also upheld
BFOQ defenses based on privacy concerns in industries such as
healthcare." 5 While mandatory maternity leave policies were
struck down across other industries, they were allowed to a cer-
tain point-usually between five and seven months1°6 -in the
airline industry. 0 7 Justifications based on concern for the safety
of the fetus or the mother could not stand, but concern for
third-party passenger safety was allowed.0 8 Thus, even though
99 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
100 See id.; Katie Manley, Note, The BFOQ Defense: Title Vll's Concession to Gender
Discrimination, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'v 169, 169 (2009).
101 Manley, supra note 100, at 169.
102 Id. at 180 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-35 (1977)).
103 Id.
104 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-37.
105 Manley, supra note 100, at 176-77.
106 See, e.g., Burwell v. E. Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 373 (4th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (allowing mandatory maternity leave for flight attendants after the
twenty-eighth week of pregnancy); In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249, 263
(S.D. Fla. 1977) (allowing mandatory maternity leave for flight attendants after
twenty weeks); MacLennan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 472 (E.D. Va.
1977) (allowing mandatory maternity leave for flight attendants after twenty-six
weeks).
107 Ralph Sharp, Pregnancy Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 125 EDUC. L. REP. 227, 282 (1998); Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at
26-27.
108 See Bunell, 633 F.2d at 373.
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courts interpreted the BFOQ defense narrowly, arguing that a
pregnant flight attendant cannot perform her duties in an emer-
gency was sufficient. Interestingly, a similar argument, that a
pregnant teacher cannot safely perform her duties to children
in an emergency, failed in Guerra.' Thus, "the incantation of a
safety rationale is not an abracadabra to which [the] court must
deferjudgment., 10 However, courts remain receptive to at least
some limitations on pregnant flight attendants based on passen-
ger-safety concerns.' 1
By the end of the 1980s, the BFOQ defense was firmly planted
in airline legal discourse, and very few cases regarding preg-
nancy in the airline industry were litigated. The latest case in-
volving mandatory maternity leave was In re Pan American
Airways, Inc. in 1990.112 There, the court struck down the air-
line's policy requiring mandatory maternity leave immediately
upon knowledge of pregnancy, but spoke approvingly in dicta of
another airline's policy requiring mandatory leave at twenty
weeks. 1 3 Thus, although courts may have been moving away
from immediate mandatory maternity leave upon knowledge of
pregnancy, they continued to allow mandatory maternity leave
policies at a certain point in a woman's pregnancy.
However, with no firm consensus among the lower courts on
the exact date when a female flight attendant must stop work
and with female flight attendants' continued need for income
during their pregnancies, claims against airlines did not totally
disappear. Instead, these cases were often settled." 4 In 1991,
the EEOC sued USAir over a policy requiring flight attendants
to take mandatory maternity leave after the thirteenth week of
pregnancy.1 5 USAir settled the case for $270,000.116 In fact, al-
though some claims are still filed, mandatory maternity leave in
the airline industry today is considered largely settled, with most
airlines allowing flight attendants to work until the third trimes-
ter of pregnancy.' 17
109 See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987).
110 Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 680 (9th Cir. 1980)
(quoting MacLennan, 440 F. Supp. at 472).
III See, e.g., Burwell, 633 F.2d at 373.
112 905 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1990).
113 Id. at 1463.
114 Reed, supra note 6, at 281-82.
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B. CURRENT AIRLINE POLICIES AND WHY THEY
ARE PROBLEMATIC
Today, collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between air-
line employers and flight-attendant unions usually include pro-
visions requiring maternity leave for flight attendants fit to
perform their duties between the second trimester and the be-
ginning of the third trimester.11 These CBA provisions may
even be considered fairly generous-although the maternity
leave is unpaid, the CBA allows female flight attendants to ac-
crue seniority and maintain health insurance and sick-leave ben-
efits while on maternity leave. 19  Furthermore, it is not
uncommon for airlines to have temporary disability policies that
include light duty assignments for employees injured on or off
the job. 2 ' Finally, major airlines typically employ more than
fifty employees and are thus governed by the FMLA, giving wo-
men up to twelve weeks of unpaid maternity leave that can also
be used, such as following the birth of the child. 121 In light of
these policies, it may seem as if discrimination against pregnant
flight attendants has largely disappeared, or is at least contained
as much as possible considering the critical interest of passenger
safety. However, although the current policies may appear rea-
sonable, in effect they enable continued discriminatory policies
against women and make it difficult to advocate for change by
pitting public safety and disability rights against women's equal
employment rights.
As courts have recognized, mandatory maternity leave in itself
is a facially discriminatory practice. 22 Thus, by codifying the
BFOQ defense, Title VII essentially enabled some forms of dis-
crimination. 23 Interestingly, the BFOQ defense specifically
does not apply to race.124 While the BFOQ defense does not
have much of an impact on pregnant women in most indus-
118 See, e.g., Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 878 N.E.
2d 647, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (describing mandatory maternity leave at
twenty-seventh week of pregnancy contained in collective bargaining agreement
between union and airline).
119 See id. at 648.
120 See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1998).
121 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612-2654 (2006).
122 See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir.
1980).
123 Manley, supra note 100, at 169.
124 Id. at 170.
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tries, 25 it has a large impact on female flight attendants due to
the recognition of passenger safety as a valid business purpose in
the airline industry and the dominance of women in these posi-
tions. 1 26 If the purpose of Title VII was to end discriminatory
employment practices against women, then it seems as if the
BFOQ defense as applied to women in the airline industry is
antithetical. 127 This is especially true in light of the suspect rea-
soning of cases that have applied the defense, concluding that
there is no reasonable business alternative to a mandatory ma-
ternity leave policy. 128 Specifically, these cases have disposed of
the argument that airlines could evaluate their female employ-
ees individually to determine their capability to work.' 29 How-
ever, as the dissent in Burwell said, some airlines do require
individual evaluation, at least until the twenty-eighth week.'
After consulting medical experts at the Mayo Clinic, Northwest
Airlines concluded that pregnancy does not affect flight attend-
ants' abilities until late in gestation.'31 As one expert in gynecol-
ogy made clear, the risk of miscarriage, which he admitted could
be disabling, poses no greater risk to pregnant flight attendants
than male stewards suffering from appendicitis or a heart attack
while in flight. 132 However, the majority apparently did not
agree and concluded that the airline's policy grounding preg-
nant flight attendants after the thirteenth week was necessary
and that there was no reasonable business alternative.1 33 Al-
though the logic of the majority is perhaps troubling, it is not
surprising. The debate regarding mandatory maternity leave
has focused on the BFOQ defense airlines assert, that of passen-
ger safety. A woman's right to continue work while pregnant,
free of discriminatory employment practices, is contrasted with
the need for public safety. Framing the debate in this way puts
women's rights activists in an uncomfortable position. Arguing
125 See id. at 176-82 (illustrating the limited successful uses of the BFOQ de-
fense for privacy and safety concerns).
126 See Burwell v. E. Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 363 (4th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (at the time the suit was brought, women accounted for ninety percent
of flight attendants).
127 See Manley, supra note 100, at 169 ("[Bly utilizing the BFOQ defense, em-
ployers are permitted to partake in the exact discriminatory practices that Title
VII directly seeks to forbid.").
128 See, e.g., Burwell, 633 F.2d at 373.
129 Id. at 372-73.
130 Id. at 375 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
131 Id.
132 Id.
"33 Id. at 371-72.
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for more equal treatment and a determination between a wo-
man and her doctor based on individual capacity to work means
denying some form of public safety. The contrast between the
needs of public safety in the airline industry and other indus-
tries is seen sharply in the Supreme Court's decision for teach-
ers in LaFleur, which found two school boards' sweeping
maternity leave policies unconstitutional because the ability to
work during pregnancy is an entirely individual matter.134 Thus,
passenger safety in the airline industry is a legitimate rationale
to bar pregnant women's continued employment, while chil-
dren's safety in schools is not.
Another problem with mandatory maternity leave policies in
the airlines is that these policies have rarely been based on firm
scientific or medical knowledge. 13 5 Instead, restrictions remain
despite advances in medical knowledge and technology, the pas-
sage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the economic
and social reality that many women in other industries work
throughout pregnancy up until giving birth. 136 Thus, employers
can potentially discriminate against their pregnant employees
based on stereotypes about the capabilities of pregnant workers,
something that the PDA expressly forbids. 137 This is illustrated
by the fact that courts have ruled in various directions when con-
sidering the validity of mandatory maternity leave in the airline
industry13 8 Furthermore, as courts have pointed out, when
mandatory maternity leave policies are in place, women often
delay reporting their pregnancies so they can work as long as
1-14 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974).
135 See Burwell, 633 F.2d at 375, 376 (Butzner, J., dissenting). Although North-
west Airlines consulted medical experts in crafting its policy, the dissent pointed
out that "without conducting any study to determine whether pregnancy impairs
stewardesses' ability to work, [Eastern] adopted the rule requiring stewardesses to
take unpaid leave when they became pregnant. Although aware that other air-
lines safely operated with less restrictive policies, Eastern has made no effort to
administer its policy on an individual basis." Id.
136 As early as 1984, the Council on Scientific Affairs recommended that wo-
men "should be able to continue productive work until the onset of labor."
Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 19.
137 Id. at 17-18.
138 See In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249, 263 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (airline
could not require mandatory maternity leave before thirteen weeks, but could
allow individual evaluation between thirteen and twenty weeks); EEOC v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 626, 627-28 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (airline could require
mandatory maternity leave upon knowledge of pregnancy); MacLennan v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 456, 472 (E.D. Va. 1977) (airline could not require
mandatory maternity leave before twenty-sixth week).
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possible.' 39 This fact calls into question whether the policies are
necessary or reflect scientific realities. Because mandatory ma-
ternity leave policies are contained today in CBAs, which also
include provisions requiring arbitration, women are not filing
claims in court against the airlines challenging mandatory ma-
ternity leave like they did in the past.140 Airlines are preferring
to settle claims as opposed to litigating them,' 4 ' which further
produces divergent policies and results for women that are not
based on current scientific knowledge.
While mandatory maternity leave policies assume that a preg-
nant flight attendant is capable and willing to work, pregnant
women may also experience discrimination when they are not
capable of performing their usual duties or are temporarily dis-
abled at some point during their pregnancies. 14 2 This situation
can be particularly troubling because the PDA is crafted in
terms of comparative rights, which courts have often interpreted
to mean comparative to other temporarily disabled workers who
have been similarly disabled. 4 ' What this means for pregnant
flight attendants who are temporarily disabled is that they are at
the mercy of their employers' temporary disability policies.'44
While airlines likely have some type of temporary disability pol-
icy in place, it may consist of a distinction between those em-
ployees injured on the job versus those that sustain off-the-job
injuries. 45 Because pregnancy does not fit neatly into either cat-
egory, courts have trouble reaching consistent and fair results.'4 6
The PDA requires comparing pregnant workers to other "simi-
larly situated" employees, which most courts have interpreted to
mean those employees injured off the job. 47 Because an em-
ployer's policy may offer light duty assignments only to those
employees with occupational injuries, pregnant flight attendants
139 See In re Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 905 F.2d 1457, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990) (preg-
nant flight attendant delayed reporting she was pregnant until she was between
twenty-one and twenty-four weeks pregnant where airline had policy requiring
pregnant flight attendants to alert their employer upon knowledge of their preg-
nancy and required immediate maternity leave).
140 Reed, supra note 6, at 267-68.
141 Id. at 282.
142 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 17.
143 Id. at 18.
144 Id. at 28.
145 See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1998) (airline
gave light duty assignments to its temporarily disabled workers who sustained on-
the-job injuries but did not provide light duty work for those injured off the job).
146 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 36.
147 Id. at 37.
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are necessarily excluded. 148 What this means for pregnant flight
attendants is that they are essentially denied an opportunity to
remain in the workforce during pregnancy and are deprived of
the opportunity to earn additional income to support their fami-
lies.149 As critics have noted, this burden often means the differ-
ence between getting by and falling ifito poverty. 150 Yet this
situation poses another problem when fighting for equal oppor-
tunity in the workplace. If pregnant women allege that they
should be compared to all temporarily disabled employees "sim-
ilar in their ability to work" (and not just in the cause of their
disability), courts often construe these claims as requests by wo-
men for "special treatment.' 15 ' The "structure of the [PDA it-
self] relies on the male norm" for benefits since pregnant
workers are afforded "only those benefits that are also granted
non-pregnant employees."' 152 Since pregnancy is inherently a fe-
male condition, the statute thus fails to adequately take into ac-
count female needs and looks at the problem through a
gendered lens. 15' By framing the argument in this way, courts
have essentially pitted women's rights against rights for disabled
workers as a whole, specifically those of disabled men.' If we
allow light duty assignments to be given to pregnant women who
are not injured on the job, we therefore allow them to step
ahead in line of disabled men. Because the debate has been
framed as a demand for special treatment, it brings up images of
the protectionist laws and other regulations now deemed harm-
ful to the achievement of women's equality. Women's rights ac-
tivists are thus inhibited by a strict definition of equality (framed
in comparison to men) from seeking policies and workplace
practices that could be potentially more beneficial and perhaps
more "equal" to pregnant women than current practices.
While discrimination against women in itself likely damages
women by reinforcing cultural stereotypes based on sex, the fact
remains that this discrimination results in a negative impact on
148 Id.
149 Brief of Women's Legal Def. Fund et al., Amici Curiae in Support of Plain-
tiff-Appellant at *3-4, Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir.
1998) (No. 96-21115), 1997 WL 33615374 [hereinafter Brief of Women's Legal
Defense Fund].
150 Id.
15' Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 41.
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women's economic realities. 55 For example, an Ohio flight at-
tendant placed on mandatory maternity leave filed for unem-
ployment and was denied.156 In the resulting lawsuit, the court
held that she was ineligible because she had left her employ-
ment voluntarily and the CBA included a mandatory maternity
leave provision at twenty-seven weeks of pregnancy. 57 Ohio had
a common-law exception to the prohibition of a waiver of unem-
ployment compensation claims for union-represented employ-
ees. '5 This exception disallowed unemployment benefits for
workers whose termination packages were pursuant to CBAs be-
cause the employees were deemed to have accepted the pack-
ages and were thus voluntarily unemployed.' 9 Because the
mandatory maternity leave policy was contained in a CBA and
union-represented employees inherently have more bargaining
power, the court concluded that the pregnant flight attendant
was subject to the agreement and thus ineligible for unemploy-
ment benefits. 160 In essence, the union bargained away preg-
nant female employees' right to unemployment compensation.
However, at least some courts have held that a Title VII right to
be free from discrimination based on sex cannot be bargained
away by a union. 16 1 Furthermore, the case recognized that the
modern view is to allow unemployment compensation when a
maternity leave policy is contained in a CBA.162 The case itself
stated that this is the law in both Florida and Colorado.16 3 How-
ever, this case illustrates the debilitating impact that inconsistent
state laws can have on the economic lives of women.1 64 As the
dissent noted, the medical field has evolved. 65 Although the
CBA provided for pregnant women to leave work at twenty-seven
weeks (roughly six months pregnant), the flight attendant's doc-
tor found no reason why she could not continue to work. 1
While some states may allow pregnant flight attendants subject
155 Brief of Women's Legal Defense Fund, supra note 149, at *3-4.
156 Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of job & Family Servs., 878 N.E. 2d 647,
650-51 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
157 Id. at 656.
158 Id. at 651.
159 Id. at 652.
16 Id. at 656.
161 See Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
162 Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Sewus., 878 N.E. 2d at 654.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 655-56.
165 Id. at 656 (Blackmon, J., dissenting).
166 Id.
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to mandatory maternity leave provisions of CBAs to collect un-
employment, others do not.16
This recent unemployment case highlights the economic real-
ity that many women today are reliant upon their income for
survival and do not have the luxury to take a three-month mater-
nity leaveJ 68 Furthermore, it stresses the need for a new look at
the current law regarding the airline industry, which is inade-
quate and fails to protect women from discrimination in the
workplace. Because they must take mandatory maternity leave
at a certain point in pregnancy that is not adequately justified by
medical knowledge or science, women are disproportionately
impacted and subjected to treatment that has a severe economic
effect on their potential earnings, ability to support themselves,
and quality of life.' 69 In addition, the mandatory maternity
leave policy does not adequately protect the public interest of
passenger safety due to variability in individual pregnancies and
the risk levels for different women. For example, a flight attend-
ant who is twenty weeks pregnant would technically be allowed
to fly under her employer's policy requiring mandatory mater-
nity leave at twenty-seven weeks. However, if this flight attend-
ant experiences symptoms, such as lower back pain, that prevent
her from doing her job safely, she could perhaps fly under the
radar and continue working despite possible safety concerns.
This situation could potentially be avoided if flight attendants
were evaluated individually based on ability to work and were
given more options to maintain economic self-sufficiency. Be-
cause debates surrounding Title VII and the PDA have been
framed with a gendered lens, women's rights have been seen as
a threat not only to the public's safety but to disabled workers as
well. This public discourse makes it even more difficult to fight
for women's equality, since efforts are seen as being in conflict
with these other interests and as a demand for special treat-
ment,170 a concept that is distasteful in the minds of the general
public and that also splits women's rights activists.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
While the current mandatory maternity leave policies in the
airline industry are problematic, the solution is not easy to iden-
167 Id.
168 Brief of Women's Legal Defense Fund, supra note 149, at *3-4.
169 Id.
170 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 34-35.
425
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tify. This is partly due to the fact that there is no quick fix for a
complex problem and because the solution can vary with the
situation. For example, a different solution may be needed
when a woman is capable and able to work during her preg-
nancy as opposed to when she is temporarily disabled during
her pregnancy. It is also difficult to advocate for change due to
the way the conversation has been framed, through a gendered
lens and as a conflict between value systems: equality versus
safety, or women's equality versus disabled workers' equality. Fi-
nally, the problem can be minimized since it affects only female
flight attendants and restricts them for just a few months.
A. SOLUTION 1: CHANGE THE DEBATE
The first possible solution is to change the debate regarding
pregnancy. Although arguably the hardest to implement, this
solution would allow the problem to be refrained from one of
opposing interests to focusing on gender discrimination and
recognizing the importance of eliminating this persistent form
of inequality. By refraining the debate, more creative solutions
can be discussed, and the confines of a fixed pie of rights for
various competing groups can be expanded.
To change the debate, we must first recognize that the debate
is cast using a gendered perspective.17 ' Instead of being neutral,
the language we use frames how we see and think about the
problem.'72 When we talk about equal rights for women, we are
really talking about treating women equally to men in a histori-
cally male-dominated and male-focused workplace. 7 Thus, by
talking about equal rights, we are limiting ourselves to those
rights that men currently enjoy.' 74 Since men cannot experi-
ence pregnancy, this comparison-based language does not take
into account the fact that the workplace we imagine does not
171 SeeJulie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 38 Am. Bus. LJ. 819, 819-23 (2001); Catherine Albiston, Insti-
tutional Inequality, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 1093, 1131-32.
172 SeeJennifer Yatskis Dukart, Comment, Geduldig Reborn: Hibbs as a Success
(?) of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Sex-Discrimination Strategy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 541,
579-82 (2005).
173 Albiston, supra note 171, at 1095.
174 As Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas note, "[T]he very structure of the
[PDA] statute relies on the male norm as the baseline for benefits-that is, preg-
nant women are guaranteed only those benefits that are also granted non-preg-
nant employees. Yet, the needs of pregnant workers are likely to differ in
significant ways from the needs of workers disabled by other causes." Grossman
& Thomas, supra note 73, at 34.
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have pregnant workers in it.' 7 5 We limit ourselves by not consid-
ering all of the possibilities, such as a workplace that does not
see pregnancy as a threat but as a normal and familiar part of
employee life.17
6
Instead of talking about equal rights in terms of men, we
should reframe the debate to be about equal rights in terms of
personal autonomy. Women and men should have the right to
pursue both a career and a family. Women and men should be
able to make decisions for themselves regarding these protected
interests. Because women and men inherently experience fam-
ily in different ways (women bear the children), the fight for
equal treatment should focus not on limiting the rights for one
group so they are the same as the other, but expanding the
rights for both. And because men never have to make the
choice between a career and a family due to pregnancy, wo-
men's forced choices should be lessened as much as possible. In
a way, we have tried to become "gender-blind"' 77 similar to how
we have tried to be "color-blind. 1 7 Yet different treatment be-
tween the genders exists, and this treatment is often quietly dis-
criminatory. 179 By refusing to recognize differences between
genders, we have solidified and accepted the disparate treat-
ment that the different groups receive.' Part of fixing the
problem is thus to recognize it and take steps to correct it.
The difference between an equal rights focus and a personal
autonomy focus can be illustrated by the language and reason-
ing courts apply to fetal protection arguments. For example, in
Asad v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the court focused on the deci-
sional autonomy that Title VII and the PDA preserve for preg-
nant women.' 81 The case involved a pregnant woman, Ms. Asad,
175 Id. at 47.
176 See Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Pwrr. L.
REV. 1043, 1052-58 (1987) (discussing the need to reform our concept of equal-
ity from an assimilation-based model, which requires women to assimilate to male
norms, to an acceptance-based model, to better fit female life patterns instead of
male ones).
177 See Manley, supra note 100, at 195-96 (discussing the myth of gender-blind-
ness in Title VII cases).
178 See David B. Oppenheimer, Color-Blindness, Racism-Blindness, and Racism-
Awareness: Revisiting Judge Henderson's Proposition 209 Decision, 13 BERKELEYJ. AFR.-
AM. L. & POL'y 229, 232-34 (2011) (discussing color-blindness versus racism-
awareness and its negative implications for fighting racial discrimination).
179 Littleton, supra note 176, at 1048-51.
180 Id.
181 328 F. Supp. 2d 772, 778 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
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who worked on the ramp at Continental. 18 2 Ms. Asad expressed
concern about the air quality, de-icing fluids, and fumes on the
ramp and their effects on her fetus, and requested a transfer.""3
The airline refused and followed its normal bidding procedure,
despite the fact that other suitable positions most likely became
available.'8 4 Ms. Asad continued to work until the week before
her son was born because (as her testimony explains) "she could
not afford to quit or take an unpaid leave of absence and was
given no other option. '' 85 Ms. Asad's child was born with cere-
bral palsy and a brain injury.1 6 Ms. Asad sued Continental for
negligence, but Continental argued that her claim was pre-
empted by the PDA, which mandated that it could not treat her
differently from other workers because of her sex. 87 The court
held that Ms. Asad's claim was not preempted.' The PDA
guarantees decisional autonomy to women regarding pregnancy
and work."8 9 The PDA prevents employment policies that dis-
criminate against pregnant women, but it does not preclude pol-
icies that take into account the reality of pregnancy so long as
these are not based on harmful stereotypes and do not disadvan-
tage women. 9 ' As the court noted,
[T]he PDA and Title VII should not prevent an employer from
temporarily transferring a pregnant women [sic], at her request,
for the protection of her fetus. A transfer under such circum-
stances would preserve the decisional autonomy of the pregnant
woman, is not based on stereotypical notions to preclude the em-
ployment of women, and in itself does not violate Title VII....
[S]uch a policy is one which might leave decisional autonomy
with the woman, protect the job security of pregnant women,
and level the playing field for male and female workers.' 9 '
Thus, although the court allowed a policy that could be argued
as "special treatment" for pregnant workers (by allowing them
to be transferred to positions outside the hierarchical bidding
process), it focused on the need for decisional autonomy as a
way to "level the playing field" or gain equality for female work-
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 777, 779-80.
185 Id. at 780.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 785.
188 Id. at 790.
189 Id. at 789.
19o Id. at 789-90.
191 Id. at 790.
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ers. Interestingly, this resulted in a policy that would allow a
pregnant worker to request a transfer due to concern for the
health of her fetus but would not allow an employer-mandated
policy transferring all pregnant workers because of fetal protec-
tion concerns.1 92 The court made clear that while this type of
alternative may impose additional costs on employers, the extra
cost of employing members of one sex does not provide an af-
firmative Title VII defense.' 93
By recasting the debate from equal treatment for men and
women to personal autonomy, the court employed a line of rea-
soning that took gender and pregnancy into account, and ulti-
mately achieved a result that gave women greater opportunities
to be treated as equals in the workplace while balancing work
and family. 94 Personal autonomy logic can be applied to
mandatory maternity leave policies in the airline industry. For
example, instead of requiring mandatory maternity leave, em-
ployers could transfer pregnant women to a less safety-conscious
position at their request. Although this transfer would violate
bidding hierarchy and potentially allow a female to be trans-
ferred before a male, it would actually better achieve equality in
the workplace between men and women by leveling the playing
field. A personal autonomy. focus takes account of the fact that
only women become pregnant, but that both women and men
should be allowed to work and have a family. Under current
policy, only men are truly allowed to make this decision for
themselves. This approach thus reshapes the debate such that
women's rights and disability rights are not in conflict, but are
each a separate goal to pursue.
If a pregnant flight attendant does not request a transfer, she
could be allowed to work as long as she and her doctor decide it
is safe. The doctor could be required to consult with the air-
line's physician or the pregnant flight attendant could be evalu-
ated by the airline's own physician. When it becomes no longer
feasible for the pregnant woman to continue to fly, she could be
transferred to a less safety-conscious position. This policy moves
the decision about work and pregnancy closer to the woman,
while taking account of the passenger safety interest by allowing
the woman and her doctor to make a joint decision about the
safety of continuing to work and fly. Therefore, instead of third-
192 See id. at 790, n.23.
193 Id.
194 See id. at 790.
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party safety consistently overriding women's interest in equal
employment opportunities, a better balance is achieved.
B. SOLUTION 2: TREAT PREGNANCY DIFFERENTLY
Another possible solution would focus on recognizing that
pregnancy is an inherently female condition with no compara-
ble male counterpart. This view would legitimize pregnancy as a
biological difference between men and women and would allow
workplace policies to recognize this difference and conform to
the unique requirements of pregnancy. Instead of treating
pregnancy as all other temporary disabilities, we would treat
pregnancy as a unique, temporary medical situation unlike
other disabilities and craft workplace policies specifically for
pregnant workers. This solution would allow advocates to re-
quest accommodations for pregnancy, such as light duty work
even when the employer has no light duty policy at all."9 5 This
solution accompanies Solution 1 not only by reframing the de-
bate from that of gender-neutral equal treatment, but also by
recognizing current treatment of pregnancy in the workplace as
inherently unequal and requesting specific changes to accom-
modate pregnancy. 9 6 Only by recognizing inequality and advo-
cating for change, including not just equal treatment but also
better treatment for pregnancy, would we be able to effectively
achieve more equality for women in the workplace.
However, this solution is unlikely to gain much traction on its
own. Disability rights activists would potentially see this as a
threat to their rights, placing women ahead of temporarily dis-
abled men by forming workplace policies that favor women.
Courts traditionally have been unreceptive to this type of argu-
ment, instead viewing the workplace as a level playing field
where a request for light duty work for pregnant employees is an
unwarranted request for special treatment that is neither justi-
fied nor beneficial for society as a whole. For example, most
courts analyzing whether women temporarily disabled during
pregnancy should be treated as all disabled employees, injured
on or off the job, or as only those employees injured off the job,
have concluded that the correct comparison group is to those
employees injured off the job, thereby rejecting a disparate im-
pact argument. 97 Even feminist activists could see this as a dan-
1'15 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 41-42.
196 Id. at 47.
197 Id. at 42.
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gerous and slippery slope back to the protectionist policies that
valued women only as mothers and homemakers rather than
workers, pushing women back into their traditional gender
roles.198
C. SOLUTION 3: EVALUATE INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITY
While there may be a consensus among the medical commu-
nity that at some point pregnant women may not be able to per-
form safety functions adequately, this determination needs to be
made on an individual basis as the Supreme Court has required
in other industries and as is consistent with the language of the
PDA.'99 The current practice of allowing an airline to decide
that all pregnant flight attendants are incapable of working with-
out risking passenger safety ignores the fact that flight attend-
ants can assess their personal abilities in consultation with their
physicians and reinforces paternalistic norms.2 0 Furthermore,
it prolongs gender discrimination by assuming that all women
are unable to work because of their pregnancies, which the Su-
preme Court expressly forbade in LaFleur.2 °1 In addition,
mandatory maternity leave policies often lack a scientific or
medical basis and are uninformed by current medical knowl-
edge.2 °2 For example, while medical professionals historically
advised women to leave their jobs at the sixth month of preg-
nancy, in 1984, the American Medical Association acknowl-
edged that "the advice given by generations of physicians
regarding work during normal pregnancy has historically been
more the result of social and cultural beliefs about the nature of
pregnancy (and of pregnant women) than the result of any doc-
umented medical experience with pregnancy and work.1202 The
council went on to recommend that most women "should be
able ... to continue productive work until the onset of labor.
20 4
198 Albiston, supra note 171, at 1130-31.
19 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 26-27.
200 See Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 680 (9th Cir.
1980).
201 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1974).
202 See Burwell v. E. Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 375 (4th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
203 Laura Schlichtmann, Comment, Accommodation of Pregnancy-Related Disabili-
ties on the Job, 15 BERKELEYJ. Emp. & LAB. L. 335, 350 (1994) (quoting Council on
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The airline-specific exception to an individual evaluation has
been questioned by judicial experts in the past but ultimately
has been upheld after a certain point. °1 5 Instead of the current
judicial allowances, the airline industry should be treated as
other industries.z 6 Although passenger safety is a legitimate
and critical public interest, the airline industry should not be
able to whisper the words "passenger safety" and expect abraca-
dabra effects without medical and scientific justification.2 7 In-
stead, a realistic alternative that would better account for a more
equal balance between freedom from gender discrimination
and passenger safety would be to evaluate pregnant flight at-
tendants on a case-by-case basis, perhaps using factors such as
the difficulty of the pregnancy, the length of the flight routes,
the size of the aircraft, and specific emergency tasks, etc. The
evaluation would be done by a medical professional, either a
doctor of the airline's choosing or the woman's personal physi-
cian. The decision about when to leave work would be taken
out of the sole grasp of the employer and placed back into the
hands of the pregnant woman and her physician.
Although this approach would ameliorate the situation, it is
not an all-encompassing solution. This approach does not ad-
dress the fact that employer policies regarding pregnancy still
use a capacity-based model and many women are temporarily
disabled or unable to work fully at some point during preg-
nancy.2 8 Furthermore, while it addresses a specific problem in
the airline industry, it does not address the larger issue of the
problematic nature of the debate surrounding pregnancy and
equal treatment. Thus, this solution alone will not solve the
complex societal problem of discrimination regarding
pregnancy.
D. SOLUTION 4: COMPARE PREGNANCY TO OTHER SIMILARLY
SITUATED DISABILITIES
While Solution 3 would help address discriminatory treatment
regarding pregnant flight attendants fully capable of working, at
least until late in pregnancy, Urbano illustrates that not all wo-
205 See Burwell, 633 F.2d at 376 (Butzner, J., dissenting). But see id. at 373.
206 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1974) (discuss-
ing mandatory maternity leaves with regard to school teachers).
207 See Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 680 (9th Cir.
1980) (quoting MacLennan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 472 (E.D. Va.
1977)).
208 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 19-21.
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men are able to perform their job responsibilities once they be-
come pregnant. 20 9 In fact, "current data . . . estimate[s] that
close to twenty-five percent of women in the U.S. workforce hold
physically strenuous jobs that may conflict with pregnancy. "210
Flight-attendant work itself has a physical component, which
courts have considered, 2 1 requiring assistance lifting passenger
baggage into overhead bins, standing for long periods, and
stooping. Some women classified as having a temporary disabil-
ity due to pregnancy are thus temporarily unable to perform
some of their assigned job functions and yet may want or need
to continue working.212 Thus, employers should allow women
to take on light duty assignments or other non-safety sensitive
positions during pregnancy. This is an especially attractive op-
tion for pregnant flight attendants. Once it is determined that a
pregnant woman is no longer able to carry out the duties of her
position as flight attendant safely or effectively, the airline could
transfer her to a light duty position. This would avoid the con-
flict between passenger safety and pregnancy discrimination by
allowing for pregnant women to be accommodated in a non-
discriminatory fashion. While opponents may argue that this
gives women special treatment, perhaps by taking away positions
available for other temporarily disabled employees, courts could
employ a disparate impact analysis to justify this action. 2 3 For
example, the PDA grants pregnant women the right to equal
treatment in comparison to non-pregnant employees who are
temporarily disabled but "similar in their ability or inability to
work." '214 Thus, where an employer has a policy affording light
duty to some employees (like employees injured on the job), a
strong argument can be made that this policy has a disparate
impact on pregnant women since it is not treating pregnant wo-
men equally to other workers similar in their ability to work;
instead, it treats pregnant women similar to only those certain
employees injured in a specific way, an "artificial distinction" not
contained in the statute.2 1 5 The comparison group should be all
209 See Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1998) (pregnant
ticketing agent experienced lower-back pain due to her pregnancy and was una-
ble to perform her existing work, which required her to lift heavy passenger
baggage).
210 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 20-21.
211 See Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1980).
212 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 30-31.
213 Id. at 47.
214 Id. at 33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
215 Id. at 36.
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disabled workers, meaning both those injured on and off the
job.216 As Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas note,
[N] ot only do women face the predictable medical event of preg-
nancy, they also are equally at risk for "off-the-job" medical con-
ditions that their male colleagues face-from car accidents to
cancer. Put differently, to the extent that women are forced to
exhaust all of their sick, vacation, and/or FMLA time because
they are not permitted to continue working during pregnancy,
they are in a worse position to weather any off-the-job period
than their male colleagues, who might have the cushion of paid
sick or vacation leave, or the guaranteed twelve weeks of unpaid
leave afforded by the FMLA.2 17
However, courts have been hesitant to apply the disparate-im-
pact theory. 218 As the Urbano court noted, "Under the PDA, an
employer is obliged to ignore a woman's pregnancy and 'to treat
the employee as well as it would have if she were not preg-
nant.'" 21 9 Yet this type of language relies on a pregnancy-blind
theory, which allows discrimination to continue by not address-
ing the systemic roots.
Even if courts accept disparate-impact claims, this approach
will not completely solve the problem. While attorneys, courts,
and employers can benefit their pregnant employees by chang-
ing the analysis from disparate treatment to disparate impact,
this change will only affect those employers who have some form
of temporary disability policy or light duty policy in place.22 °
Thus, pregnant employees whose employers have no temporary
disability policy at all will still be left in the cold. At some point,
it may be necessary to treat pregnancy differently to achieve a
better outcome for pregnant workers and to pass laws requiring
substantive changes to employer disability policies, like the
FMIA did for maternity leave policies.221
E. SOLUTION 5: STATE ACTION
In some instances states have passed laws more favorable to
pregnant women than are required by federal law. For exam-
ple, states have passed laws regarding family medical leave that
216 Id.
217 Id. at 47.
218 See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998).
219 Id. (quoting Piraino v. Int'l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th
Cir. 1996)) (emphasis added).
220 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 73, at 35-36.
221 Id. at 29.
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supplement the FMLA.222 However, other states have laws that
are not so generous, as illustrated by Ohio's line of common-law
authority prohibiting pregnant women subject to a CBA from
collecting unemployment and lack of a statutory override.223
While the reality of divergent state laws regarding treatment of
pregnancy discrimination can be vexing, the broad room for ex-
perimentation has sometimes produced interesting and hopeful
results. For example, some states have statutes or regulations
mandating accommodation of pregnancy-related disabilities,
even if the employer does not offer this treatment to other tem-
porarily disabled employees. 224 A California statute requires
temporary transfer of an employee with a pregnancy-related dis-
ability to a less strenuous or hazardous position during the preg-
nancy as long as (1) "the employee requests the transfer" (on
advisement of a physician); (2) "the employer can 'reasonably
accommodate' the transfer"; and (3) "the transfer does not re-
quire creating a new position, discharging a fellow employee,
transferring an employee with greater seniority, or promoting
an employee lacking qualifications for the new position. 225
However, only five states and one territory (California, Connect-
icut, Louisiana, Oregon, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii) have such
laws or regulations.226 While arguably greater consistency
among state statutes would be desirable, state legislatures are in
a unique position to meet the needs of their pregnant employ-
ees as courts are limited to judicial doctrines and states may be
better able to regulate employers.227 Constituents should push
their representatives to fight for more accommodating policies
that meet the needs of pregnant employees. Legislatures should
be aware of the progressive laws in other states, and try to pro-
vide their residents with similar rights. Finally, legislatures
should push for more uniform unemployment compensation
laws, allowing pregnant flight attendants to collect unemploy-
ment for the time that they are put on mandatory maternity
leave. This policy would help alleviate some of the financial
stress and inequality that results from foregoing wages for sev-
eral months, even when a woman is able and willing to work.
222 Id. at 30.
223 See Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 878 N.E. 2d
647, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
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V. CONCLUSION
A comprehensive solution to the problem of discrimination
inherent in mandatory maternity leave policies for female flight
attendants will require a combination of various solutions. Re-
framing the debate from an equal treatment theory to an auton-
omy theory will not by itself eliminate discriminatory treatment.
Instead, courts, advocates, and employers must implement new
policies, such as evaluating individual capacity of pregnant work-
ers, treating pregnancy differently, and/or applying light duty
policies to pregnant employees. Finally, state action will likely
be necessary to push employers to implement light duty policies
if the policy does not already exist and create favorable preg-
nancy laws. Together, these strategies will help give meaning to
Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's desire to end
discriminatory treatment of pregnant workers, especially in the
case of female flight attendants, and find a better balance of the
competing interests of passenger safety, gender discrimination,
and disability rights.
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